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Animal Defenders International v UK: sensible dialogue or a bad case of 
Strasbourg jitters? 
 
In Animal Defenders International v United Kingdom (ADI) the Grand Chamber of the European 
Court of Human Rights (the Grand Chamber), having deliberated for over thirteen months, held that 
the United Kingdom’s statutory ban on paid political advertisements in the broadcast media did not 
breach the free speech rights of an animal rights NGO that wished to broadcast an advertisement 
publicising the ill treatment of primates in captivity.1  The Grand Chamber reached its decision by the 
slenderest of majorities, 9:8, and in so doing departed from its recent case law on broadcast political 
advertising. The case raises serious issues concerning the adjudication of freedom of expression cases, 
and of human rights cases more generally.  Some of these concerns will be explored below, following 
a summary of the factual and legal background to the case. 
 
LEGISLATIVE BACKGROUND 
 
                                                          
1 Animal Defenders International v United Kingdom App no 48876/08,  judgment of 22 April 2013.  The 
hearing had been on the 7th March 2012.  The Fourth Section the Court relinquished jurisdiction to the Grand 
Chamber under Article 30 European Convention on Human Rights on 29th November 2011. 
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The Communications Act 2003 prohibits the broadcasting of political advertisements on 
television and radio.2 This follows previous statutory bans going back to the inception of 
commercial television in 1954.3 The purpose of the prohibition is to protect the equality of 
opportunity within the democratic process, preventing democratic debate being distorted by 
wealthy individuals and /or organisations buying up airtime and flooding the airwaves with 
their own political messages.4 The Secretary of State for Culture Media and Sport, Tessa 
Jowell MP, explained the rationale for the ban during the passage of the Communications 
Bill: ‘[b]y denying powerful interests the chance to skew political debate, the current ban 
safeguards the public and democratic debate, and protects the impartiality of broadcasters’.5   
The example of the USA where restrictions on political advertising have been held to infringe 
the right to free speech under the First Amendment of the Constitution,6 and where money is 
a―perhaps the―key determinant of electoral success, is frequently held up as the 
(undesirable) likely consequence of removing the ban.7 
                                                          
2 Communications Act 2003, s 319(2)(g).  Section 333 retains the previous regime which applied to Party 
Political and Party Election Broadcasts, time for which is allocated, free of charge, to the biggest political 
parties. 
3 See eg the Television Act 1954, sched 2; Broadcasting Act 1990, s 92.  See R v Radio Authority Ex parte Bull 
[1998] QB 294 CA (Civ Div); J. Stevens and D. Feldman, ‘Broadcasting advertisements by bodies with political 
objectives, judicial review and the influence of charities law’ [1997] PL 615. 
4 For an excellent review of this area of see J. Rowbottom, Democracy Distorted: Wealth Influence and 
Democratic Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010). 
5 HC Deb vol 395 col 788 3 December 2002.  In 1998 the Neill Committee on Standards in Public Life had 
recommended that the ban be retained for these reasons, Fifth Report, The Funding of Political Parties in the 
United Kingdom, 1998, Cm 4057-1, 13.7. , 173-180. 
6 Citizens United v Federal Election Commission 558 US (2010). 
7 See eg the speech of Baroness Hale in R (on the application of Animal Defenders International) v Secretary of 
State for Culture Media and Sport [2008] UKHL 15; [2008] 1 AC 1312 at [47-48]. 
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   The aims of protecting democracy from distortion by wealthy interests and preserving 
broadcaster’s impartiality are promoted by section 321 of the Communications Act: an 
advertisement will contravene the prohibition if it is either ‘by or on behalf of a body whose 
objects are wholly or mainly of a political nature’8 or is ‘directed towards a political end’.9 
However the Communications Act’s reach is far greater than party political and electoral 
matters.10  Under section 321(3) the terms ‘objects of a political nature’  and ‘political ends’ 
are defined widely so as to include: ‘influencing the outcome of elections and referendums’;11 
‘bringing about changes in the law’ and/or ‘influencing the legislative process’;12  promoting 
the interests of political parties and groups;13 ‘influencing the policies or decisions of 
governments’;14 ‘persons on whom public functions are conferred by law’15 or ‘international 
agreements’;16 and ‘influencing public opinion on a matter which, in the United Kingdom, is 
a matter of public controversy’.17  The provision has been subjected to much academic 
criticism on account of its breadth, catching as it does not just political parties but social 
advocacy groups seeking to influence debate about matters of controversy.18 
                                                          
8 Communications Act 2003 s 321(2)(a). 
9 ibid s 321(2)(b). 
10 Lord Scott described the width of the prohibition as ‘remarkable’ in Animal Defenders n 9 above at [41]. 
11 Communications Act 2003 s 321(3)(a).  Covers the UK and elsewhere. 
12 ibid s 321 (3)(b). 
13 ibid s 321(3)(g). 
14 ibid s 321(3)(c). In the UK or elsewhere. 
15 ibid s 321(3)(d). In the UK or elsewhere. 
16 ibid s 321(3)(e). In the UK or elsewhere. 
17 ibid s 321(3)(f). 
18 See eg A. Scott, ‘“A Monstrous and Unjustifiable Infringement”?: Political Expression and the Broadcasting 
Ban on Advocacy Advertising (2003) 66 MLR 224; E. Barendt, Freedom of Speech (Oxford: OUP, 2006) 444-
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ANIMAL DEFENDERS: THE CHALLENGE IN THE UNITED KINDGOM 
 
It is against this statutory backdrop that Animal Defenders International (ADI), a non profit, 
non charitable animal rights NGO submitted a short film to be broadcast on commercial 
television networks as part of its ‘My Mate’s a Primate’ campaign highlighting the abuse of 
primates by humans.   The film juxtaposed a girl and a chimpanzee in a cage, accompanied 
by the text ‘A chimp has the mental and emotional age of a 4 year old child’, and concluding 
with a request for donations.19  Clearance for the advert was refused on the basis that it would 
fall foul of the Communications Act since ADI was a body whose objects were ‘mainly of a 
political nature’.20  Therefore ADI sought, by way of a judicial review, a declaration under 
section 4 of the Human Rights Act 1998 (HRA) that the statutory prohibition on broadcast 
political advertisements was incompatible with Article 10 of the European Convention on 
Human Rights (ECHR).21   
                                                          
445 and 484-486; H. Fenwick and G. Phillipson, Media Freedom under the Human Rights Act (Oxford: OUP, 
2006)  1015-1036;  C. Munro, ‘Time up for the Ban’ (2007) 157 NLJ 886.   The impact of the prohibition can be 
seen on the Make Poverty History campaign whose ‘One Click’ advert was banned, see Ofcom Bulletin issue 
43, 12 September 2005, 4-14, available at http://stakeholders.ofcom.org.uk/binaries/enforcement/broadcast-
bulletins/pcb52/issue43a.pdf (last visited 24 June 2013). 
19 The film can be seen here: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qON_lFQE4HY (last visited 24 June 2013). 
20 By the Broadcasting Advertising Clearance Centre, an informal body funded by commercial broadcasters to 
monitor proposed advertisements. 
21 Article 10(1) of the ECHR provides that: ‘Everyone has the right to freedom of expression. This right shall 
include freedom to hold opinions and to receive and impart information and ideas without interference by public 
authority and regardless of frontiers. This Article shall not prevent States from requiring the licensing of 
broadcasting, television or cinema enterprises.’ Article 10(2) states:  ‘The exercise of these freedoms, since it 
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   Both the Divisional Court22 and a unanimous House of Lords23 held that the ban was not 
incompatible with Article 10.  Their Lordships accepted the “anti-distortion” argument―that 
restrictions on political advertising were necessary to ensure that ‘the playing field of debate 
should as far as possible be level’.24  The real question was not whether some limitations 
were necessary, but rather whether such an all encompassing prohibition was proportionate, 
especially  given that ADI itself is clearly not one of those wealthy groups whose domination 
of the air-waves the legislation is intended to prevent.  Alternative, more finely tuned regimes 
might be feasible, which would achieve the objectives of protecting democracy and yet still 
allow groups such as ADI to get their message across in the most effective medium, for 
example a system of rationing or capping.  However, their Lordships held that the question of 
how to balance freedom of expression and the protection of democratic process was best 
resolved by elected MPs.  Given the power and pervasiveness of TV, ‘great weight’ should 
be accorded to parliament’s view that it was necessary to impose a blanket ban on all  
                                                          
carries with it duties and responsibilities, may be subject to such formalities, conditions, restrictions or penalties 
as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society, in the interests of national security, territorial 
integrity or public safety, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, for the 
protection of the reputation or rights of others, for preventing the disclosure of information received in 
confidence, or for maintaining the authority and impartiality of the judiciary.’ 
22 R (on the application of Animal Defenders International) v Secretary of State for Culture Media & Sport   
[2006] EWHC 3069 (Admin) (04 December 2006); (2007) HRLR 9.  (Auld LJ and Ousely J) 
23  R (On the Application of Animal Defenders International) v Secretary of State For Culture, Media and Sport 
[2008] UKHL 15 (12 March 2008); [2008] 1 AC 1312. Lord Bingham, Lord Scott and Baroness Hale gave fully 
reasoned speeches. Lords Carswell and Neuberger agreed with the reasons given by Lord Bingham. The appeal 
from the Divisional Court was ‘leapfrogged’.  Hereinafter, for ease of reference, the House of Lords stage of the 
case will be referred to as ‘Animal Defenders’, and the European Court of Human Rights stage as ‘ADI’. 
24 ibid at [28] (Lord Bingham). 
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‘political’ advertisements in the broadcast media and that more nuanced systems taking 
account individual cases, or rationing or capping, were not workable since they would lead to 
uncertainty, unfairness and many legal challenges.25  ‘Government had considered that no fair 
and workable compromise solution could be found which would address the problem―a 
judgment which Parliament accepted’ and which Lord Bingham saw ‘no reason to 
challenge’.26  
 
THE STRASBOURG POSITION ON BROADCASTING BANS ON POLITICAL 
ADVERTISING PRIOR TO ADI 
 
When ADI applied for judicial review in the domestic courts it doubtless was confident that 
its prospects of securing a declaration of incompatibility were good, given that the protection 
afforded to political speech and speech bearing on matters of public concern by the European 
Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) has, famously, been very strong. The ECtHR has repeatedly 
said that ‘there is little scope under Article 10(2) of the Convention for restrictions on 
political speech or on debate of questions of public interest’, and the margin of appreciation 
afforded to states in such cases has been narrow.27 Freedom of political debate is said to be at 
the ‘very core of the concept of democratic society which prevails throughout the 
Convention’.28  Furthermore, ADI would have drawn encouragement from the ECtHR’s 
specific case law concerning broadcasting bans on political advertisements.  In VgT Verein 
                                                          
25 ibid at [31-33] (Lord Bingham). 
26 ibid at [31]. 
27 See eg Lingens v Austria (1986) 8 EHRR 103 at [42]; Castells v  Spain (1992) 14 EHRR 445 at [43]; Thorgeir 
Thorgeirson v Iceland 14 EHRR 843 at [63]; Éditions Plon v France (2004) 42 EHRR 36. 
28 ibid n 23 Lingens at [42]. 
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gegen Tierfabriken v Switzerland (VgT) a Swiss animal rights organisation, in response to 
commercials by the meat industry, wished to broadcast an advert highlighting the plight of 
factory farmed pigs and enjoining viewers to ‘eat less meat’.29 Switzerland had a 
broadcasting ban on political advertisements which, like the United Kingdom’s ban, was 
designed to ‘prevent financially powerful groups from obtaining a competitive political 
advantage’ and ensure broadcasters’ independence’.30 The ECtHR accepted that it was 
legitimate to impose limits on broadcast advertising in order to protect democracy in ‘certain 
situations’.31 However the blanket ban constituted a disproportionate interference  since VgT 
was clearly not a wealthy group that was in a position to distort the political process in the 
way envisaged by the legislation; all it intended to do was to ‘participate in an on-going 
general debate on animal protection and the rearing of animals’.32  The reasons for the ban 
given by the Swiss authorities did not demonstrate ‘in a “relevant and sufficient” manner why 
the grounds generally advanced in support of the prohibition of political advertising also 
served to justify the interference in the particular circumstances of  [VgT]’s case’.33  
Furthermore because this was a restriction on political expression the margin of appreciation 
to be afforded to the state was necessarily narrowed.34 
                                                          
29 VgT Verien gegen Tierfabriken v Switzerland ((2002) 34 EHRR 4 (Chamber, Second Section). 
30 ibid at [63]. 
31 VgT at [73] and [75]. 
32 ibid at [75]. 
33 ibid.  
34 ibid at [71]. (Albeit the background context of the expression was commercial advertising, an area in which 
the margin of afforded to states is usually widened.) It was the political nature of the expression in VgT that 
allowed the Court to distinguish it in the later case of Murphy v Ireland (2004) 38 EHRR 13 which concerned 
the Irish broadcasting ban on religious advertising.  The Court in Murphy distinguished VgT on the basis that 
there a wider margin of appreciation should be afforded to states when regulating speech within ‘the sphere of 
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   The VgT judgment posed problems for the United Kingdom government during the passage 
of the Communications Bill.  Indeed the government took the highly unusual step of making 
a statement under section 19(1)(b) HRA to the effect that it was unable to make a statement 
that the Bill was compatible with Convention rights.35 Moreover VgT posed problems for the 
House of Lords in ADI, bound as it was to ‘take it into account’ by virtue of section 2 HRA. 
However Lord Bingham held that the argument that it was necessary to maintain the ‘level 
playing field of debate’ had not been ‘deployed’ to its ‘full strength’ in the Swiss case which 
was in any event distinguishable as VgT had been seeking to respond to a meat industry 
campaign, which was not the case in Animal Defenders.36 Lord Scott stressed the fact-
sensitivity of Strasbourg judgments, saying that it was therefore ‘perilous to transpose the 
outcome of one case to another where the facts are different’.37 
   Notwithstanding their Lordships doubts about the more general applicability of VgT the 
ECtHR appeared strongly to reaffirm its approach to broadcasting bans on political 
advertising in TV Vest and  Rogaland Pensjonistparti v Norway, albeit in this case in respect 
of a minor political party which struggled to secure any coverage in mainstream 
programming due to the dominance of the major parties and whose only access to the 
airwaves was through paid advertising.38   
                                                          
morals or, especially, religion’; and on the basis of the ‘nature and level of the religious sensitivities’ in Ireland 
at [67]. 
35 See the Parliamentary Joint Committee on Human Rights Report on the Draft Communications Bill, 
Nineteenth Report of Session 2001-02, HL Paper 149, HC 1102, 19th July 2002, at [58 - 64]. 
36 ibid at [28-29]. 
37 ibid at [43] 
38 TV Vest AS and Rogaland Pensionistparti v Norway ((2009) 48 EHRR 51 (Chamber, First Section). The UK 
government intervened in TV Vest, attaching a copy of the House of Lords judgment in Animal Defenders for 
the Court’s consideration [54 - 57], but to no avail.  Furthermore, the Grand Chamber of the ECtHR found a 
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ANIMAL DEFENDERS AT STRASBOURG 
 
The central question for the Grand Chamber in ADI was not whether some restriction on 
political advertising was legitimate to protect democratic processes from distortion: all sides 
agreed that it was.39 Rather, it was whether a wide broadcasting ban that caught not just 
wealthy political actors but also social advocacy groups posing no threat to democracy, was a 
proportionate interference with ADI’s Article 10 rights.  
   The majority held that it did―the ban did not violate Article 10.40  The crucial step in the 
Grand Chamber’s reasoning was its characterisation of the ban as a ‘general measure’.41 
Having regard to the case law the majority divined a trend: ‘in order to determine the 
proportionality of a general measure, the Court must primarily assess the legislative choices 
underlying it.’42  Of particular importance, the majority held, was ‘the quality of the 
parliamentary and judicial review of the necessity of the measure’, and the ‘risk of abuse if 
the general measure were to be relaxed’, a question that was ‘primarily for the state to 
assess’. Where a system of ‘case by case examination’ would ‘give rise to a risk of significant 
uncertainty’, then it was more likely that a general measure would be found to be a ‘more 
feasible means of achieving the legitimate aim’.43  Further, ‘the more convincing the general 
                                                          
fresh breach of Article 10 in VgT Veriein gegen Tierfabrieken v Switzerland (No 2) app no 32772/02 (24 June 
2009)  after a failure by the Swiss authorities to lift the ban.   
39 ADI n 1 at [106] and [112] 
40 The majority comprised Judges Casadevall, Vajić, Steiner, Hirvelä, Nicolaaou, Poalelungi, Pardalos and 
Keller. Judge Bratza gave a separate concurring opinion.   
41 ADI n 1 at [107].  Meaning a general measure whose impact is not tailored to the facts of individual cases.  
42 ibid at [108].  See also the concurring opinion of Judge Bratza at [4] and [7]. 
43 ibid. 
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justifications for the general measures are, the less importance the Court will attach to its 
impact in a particular case’.44  Crucially, the majority stated:  
 
‘The central question as regards ... [general] measures is not, as the applicant suggested, 
whether less restrictive rules should have been adopted, or indeed, whether the State could 
prove that, without the  prohibition, the legitimate aim would not be achieved. Rather the core 
issue is whether, in adopting the general measure and  striking the balance it did, the 
legislature acted within the margin of appreciation afforded to it’.45   
 
Moreover, on the question of the margin of appreciation, the Grand Chamber noted, since 
there ‘is a wealth of historical, cultural and political differences [sic] within Europe ... it is for 
each State to mould its own democratic vision’ and because of their close contact with the 
‘vital forces of their countries, their societies and their needs, the legislative and judicial 
authorities are in the best place to assess the particular difficulties of safeguarding the 
democratic order in their State’.46 
   Having set up the question in this way it was a comparatively easy step for the majority to 
find that the interference with ADI’s rights was proportionate. Crucially, they found that 
there had been ‘exceptional examination by parliamentary bodies of the cultural, political and 
legal aspects of the prohibition’ coupled with the detailed debate and analysis by the domestic 
courts. The former, it was noted, possessed ‘particular competence’ in this area and 
‘considerable weight’ was attached ‘to [the] exacting and pertinent reviews’ held by both 
parliament and the courts leading to their finding that ‘general measures were necessary to 
                                                          
44 ibid at [109]. 
45 ibid.  See also the concurring opinion of Judge Bratza at [17].  
46 ibid at [111]. 
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prevent distortion of crucial public interest debates’ and the ‘undermining of the democratic 
process’.47 Furthermore, the ban was ‘specifically circumscribed’, and minimally impaired 
freedom of expression because it only applied to paid advertising on TV and radio, leaving 
ADI free to participate in ordinary discussion programmes and to use other means of 
communication such as print, posters, public protest and the internet, or alternatively set up a 
non-political charitable arm which would be exempt from the ban.48 In addition the Grand 
Chamber noted that the United Kingdom’s system of free party political broadcasts for 
political parties mitigated, in a general sense, the harshness of the ban, although (as the Grand 
Chamber admitted) this did not help ADI itself.49 
   ADI had argued that an alternative, more finely tuned regime would be preferable, which 
would allow social advocacy groups to advertise outside of election periods, and adjudicated 
for example on a ‘case by case’ basis or a system of involving spending caps.50  However the 
Grand Chamber held that this was primarily an issue for determination by domestic 
authorities and the United Kingdom bodies had reached the conclusion that such alternative 
schemes would not be feasible either due, respectively, to the risk of arbitrariness (with 
accompanying uncertainty, litigation, expense and delay) or abuse (for example political 
                                                          
47 ibid at [114-116]. See also the concurring opinion of Judge Bratza at [12] and [13]. For a summary of the 
various stages of legislative examination and consultation process see [41-54].  The bodies consulted included 
the Joint Committee on Human Rights, the Independent Television Commission, and the Electoral Commission. 
48 ibid at [117] and [124]. See also the concurring opinion of Judge Bratza at [15]. 
49 ibid at [121]. See also the concurring opinion of Judge Bratza at [15] and the dissent of Judge Tulkens et al at 
[14]. 
50 Such nuanced systems exist in many European countries (eg Switzerland, Denmark, Norway, Sweden,  Italy 
the Czech Republic and Belgium).  The type and range of systems, from complete bans to systems with no 
restrictions at all, was surveyed by the European Platform of Regulatory Authorities, May 2006, summarised in 
ADI n 1 above at [65-69]. 
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organisations setting up fronting social advocacy groups to circumvent any spending cap). 
Further, these alternative schemes might compromise the principle of broadcasting 
impartiality.51 On the question of restrictions placed on political advertising on TV and radio, 
the majority reiterated, there was no consensus among Contracting states and the margin of 
appreciation to be afforded should be ‘somewhat wider than … than that normally afforded to 
restrictions on matters of public interest’.52 In conclusion the Grand Chamber found that the 
‘reasons adduced by the authorities to justify the prohibition of [ADI’s] advertisement [were] 
relevant and sufficient … [and] the prohibition [could not] therefore be considered to be a 
disproportionate interference with the applicant’s right to freedom of expression’.53 
 
COMMENT 
 
This case raises several issues of concern, both with regard to the adjudication of freedom of 
expression cases specifically, and also in relation to the European Convention system for 
human rights protection more broadly. 
 
General measure or blanket ban? 
The first area of concern is in relation to the Grand Chamber’s identification of the case as 
one involving ‘general measures’.  Essentially the majority seems to be saying, as a general 
proposition, that where a state interferes with human rights by way of a broad legal 
                                                          
51 ibid at [122]. 
52 ibid at [123]. The Court acknowledged in the area of political advertising broadcasting bans it was particularly 
difficult to assess the level of consensus between states and compare regimes due to the differing  interpretations 
of the term ‘political’ in different legal regimes. 
53 ibid at [125]. 
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prohibition that has a legitimate aim but which catches within its broad sweep or fine mesh 
those whose circumstances place them outside the scope of the legislation’s aim then, as long 
as there has been a proper debate by the legislative organs that introduced it in the first place, 
it will likely be found to be proportionate.  This approach is open to criticism for several 
reasons.  
   In its well-established Article 10 jurisprudence the European Court’s method of 
establishing if a particular interference is ‘necessary in a democratic society’ is to determine 
whether it is in response to a ‘pressing social need’, whether it is ‘proportionate to the 
legitimate aim pursued’ and ‘whether the reasons given to justify it by the national authorities 
are relevant and sufficient’.54  Regard must also be had to the appropriate margin of 
appreciation to be afforded to the state at this stage.55  However, as the dissenting judges 
pointed out, the majority judgment in ADI significantly waters down this approach in cases 
where a state’s legislature has sought to achieve a particular aim by way of a ‘general 
measure’.56  In such circumstances, at least where a ‘general measure’ has been used because 
it is claimed that alternatives would lead to uncertainty or abuse then, following ADI, the 
emphasis is to be placed on the question of whether the reasons given for adopting the 
general measure are relevant and sufficient. This is indicated by the Grand Chamber’s subtle 
re-definition of its own role in respect of the Article 10(2) ‘necessary in a democratic society’ 
test:  to ‘assess whether the reasons adduced to justify the prohibition were both “relevant” 
and “sufficient” and thus whether the interference corresponded to a “pressing social need” 
                                                          
54 Sunday Times v UK (1979) 2 EHRR 245, at [62]. Admittedly this test is rather sporadically and inconsistently 
applied, see H Fenwick and G Phillipson, Media Freedom under the Human Rights Act (Oxford: OUP, 2006), 
93-106.   
55 Handyside v UK (1976) 1 EHRR 737 at [48-49]. 
56 ADI n 1 above dissent of Judge Ziemele et al  at [3-4]. 
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and was proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued’.57  Thus in ‘general measures’ cases the 
relevancy and sufficiency of the reasons provided becomes the crucial determinant of 
whether the ‘social need’ is ‘pressing’ and the interference proportionate, rather than merely 
the final element of the analysis.58  
   The problem with this ‘general measures’ approach is that scrutiny of the impact of the 
legislation on the individual applicant will be significantly diminished. If a state introduces a 
general ban, but ensures that its legislative and executive bodies properly deliberate upon it, 
this will lead to a reduced intensity of examination by the Court, arguably to the point where 
it becomes merely a review of the quality of the debate at national level, rather than of the 
measure’s impact in the ‘particular case’ before it.59 The Grand Chamber stated that ‘the 
application of the general measure to the facts of the case remains ... illustrative of its impact 
in practice and is thus material to its proportionality’.60   But this, in effect, writes the 
individual applicant out of the equation. It is difficult to see, from the right holder’s 
perspective, why the quality and quantity of debate should have a determinative impact on 
whether there has been a violation of their rights.61  Furthermore, as the dissenting judges 
commented, the approach of the majority disregards the well established principle that in 
order for a measure to be proportionate and necessary ‘there must be no other means of 
                                                          
57 ADI n 1 above at [105] (emphasis added). 
58 As Fenwick and Phillipson point out, n 56 above, at 94, ‘the requirement that the “reasons” given be “relevant 
and sufficient” is largely meaningless [since] it is self-evident that they must be “relevant” [and] what counts as 
“sufficient” evidence will depend on how closely the Court is minded to scrutinize the factual matrix, which 
really depends upon how intensely it is applying the proportionality test’. 
59 Murphy v Ireland (2004) 38 EHRR 13 at [68];  VgT n3 above  at [75]; TV Vest n3 above at [63] and [69].  
60 ADI n 1 above at [108] 
61 This point was made forcefully by Judge Ziemele et al, dissenting, in ADI n 1 above,  at [8-10]. 
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achieving the same end that would interfere less seriously with the fundamental right 
concerned’.62   
   In the United Kingdom’s domestic human rights jurisprudence, since the passage of the 
HRA, a strong stance has been taken against a “formalist” approach which examines the 
adequacy of the decision making process behind a measure which interferes with Convention 
rights.63 In particular the domestic courts have expressly rejected approaches which would 
allow consideration of  the quality of debate in parliament as going to whether a measure is 
proportionate or not, holding that this would contravene Article 9 of the Bill of Rights 1689.64 
Thus in Wilson v First County Trust Ltd Lord Nicholls held:‘[i]t is a cardinal constitutional 
principle that the will of Parliament is expressed in the language used by it in its enactments. 
The proportionality of legislation is to be judged on that basis … [it] is not to be judged by 
the quality of reasons advanced in support of it in the course of parliamentary debate’.65 
   It stark contrast, recent Strasbourg jurisprudence has tended to place emphasis on the 
presence or absence, or quality of, parliamentary debate. Indeed in the prisoner voting ban 
                                                          
62 ADI n 1 above, dissent of Judge Tulkens et al at [16], and of Judge Ziemele et al at [14]. Judge Tulkens et al 
noted that in all of the debate by the domestic legislative bodies and courts, no convincing arguments were put 
for rejecting the less restrictive solutions that do operate in most other Contracting States. 
63 R (on the application of Begum v Headteacher and Governors of Denbigh High School [2006] UKHL 15, 
[2007] 1 AC 100; Belfast City Council v  Miss Behavin’ Limited (Northern Ireland) [2007] UKHL 19,  [2007] 1 
WLR 1420, 
64 Wilson and First County Trust [2003] UKHL 40; [2004]1 AC 816.  Article 9 of the Bill of Rights 1689 states: 
‘That the Freedome of Speech and Debates or Proceedings in Parlyment ought not to be impeached or 
questioned in any Court or Place out of Parlyament’.  
65 Wilson n 61 at [67] (Lord Nicholls). Their Lordships all agreed, Lord Hope at [115 - 118], Lord Hobhouse at 
[140 - 145], Lord Scott at [173], Lord Rodger at [178]. See also R v Secretary of State for Education and 
Employment , ex parte Williamson [2005] UKHL 15; [2005] 2 AC 256 at [51] (Lord Nicholls) 
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case, Hirst v United Kingdom (no 2), the failure to have such a debate counted against the 
United Kingdom and was one of the factors leading the Court to find of an absence of 
proportionality.66  This line of reasoning leads to an uncomfortable inference:  that states may 
impose broad restrictions on protected rights, and as long as they do tick the correct boxes in 
terms of debate, this will exempt them from the rigours of full proportionality review at any 
subsequent Strasbourg hearing. By the same token, states which may adopt identical 
measures, but whose legislatures do not conduct such full debates will be far more likely to 
be found in breach.67 The question arises: if the law makers in Switzerland and Norway had 
conducted more extensive reviews when introducing their own broadcasting bans, might 
those states have escaped censure by the Strasbourg court in VgT and TV Vest respectively?  
The conclusion to be drawn from the majority judgment in ADI is that they would. 
   It might also be noted that it was only because of the VgT judgment that the ‘exceptional 
examination’ by the United Kingdom’s parliamentary and judicial bodies took place at all. 
Had it not been for VgT it is virtually certain that the pre-legislative and legislative scrutiny, 
(and judicial review), would have been far less searching.68  The irony here is obvious―the 
VgT case itself provoked the discussion that accompanied the passage of the Communications 
                                                          
66 Hirst v United Kingdom (no 2) (2006) 42 EHRR 41, [79]. See Judge Bratza’s concurring opinion in ADI n1 
above at [12].  The question arises: what if there had been a full debate on prisoner voting prior to the passage of 
the Representation of the People Act 1983 (the impugned measure in Hirst)?  See T Lewis ‘“Difficult and 
Slippery Terrain”: Hansard, Human Rights and Hirst v UK’ (2006) PL 209. 
67 In this regard it is notable that the Court in VgT in which the broadcasting ban was arguably less broad the 
UK’s (see the dissent of Judge Ziemele et al in ADI at [2] and Tulkens et al at [12]) held that the reasons given 
by the Swiss authorities were not relevant and sufficient at [75]. 
68 The Neill Committee report, n 7 above, predated VgT and whilst supportive of the ban on political broadcast 
advertising, focussed on the issue as it related to political parties and did not address the allegation of over-
breadth in relation to social advocacy groups. 
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Bill in the United Kingdom.  The very fact that this debate had taken place contributed, in 
turn, to the quasi-overruling of VgT  by the Grand Chamber in ADI.   Indeed the crucial factor 
seems to have been the mere happenstance of the timing of legislative measures in relation to 
the Court’s judgments: had the Communications Bill completed its passage before the VgT 
ruling the parliamentary deliberations would, without doubt, have been nowhere near as 
intensive.  
   Given the critical consequence of categorising a provision as a ‘general measure’ it would 
seem to be crucial to have a clear definition of this term.  This is made all the more important 
by the fact that a ‘general measure’ appears to be strikingly similar to what, in other cases, 
the European Court has categorised as a ‘blanket ban’,69 and/or as ‘prior restraint’.70 In these 
latter instances, however, the Court has insisted that such restrictions are subjected to careful 
scrutiny with the state afforded only a narrow margin of appreciation.  In reality however it is 
difficult to a distinction difference these “bad” forms of restraint and the acceptable and 
justifiable ‘general measure’.  
   It could be argued that the difference in ADI was the fact that other means of 
communication―eg newspapers, demonstrations, posters and the internet―were still 
available for social advocacy groups to get their message across.71  This is a weak argument.  
If the ban had covered these other media this would have constituted such a drastic 
interference with the freedom of political expression that it could never have withstood 
human rights challenge.  The Communications Act ban was a blanket ban in the sense that it 
                                                          
69 See eg Hirst n 65 at [76] 
70 Observer and Guardian v United Kingdom (1992) 14 EHRR 153 [60].  In ADI n 1 above Judge Ziemele et al  
noted that this was ‘almost a blanket restriction’ (at [2]) which ‘border[ed] on prior restraint’ (at [10]). 
71 ADI n 1 at [124] 
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denied access completely to broadcast advertising, arguably the most effective means of mass 
communication.72 
   It is clear, then, that in future cases a great deal will turn on whether the Court classifies a 
restriction a ‘general measure’ or ‘blanket ban’. By way of illustration, consider the prisoner 
voting case, Hirst.  The ban in that case arguably was not so very different to that in ADI. It 
applied only to those convicted of crimes serious enough to warrant a custodial sentence, and 
only during their period of incarceration.   It did not apply to criminals subject to fines, 
suspended sentences or community service, or to those detained on remand or for contempt 
of court, fine default, or unconvicted detained mental patients.73 But the Grand Chamber in 
Hirst did not hesitate to categorise that ban as a ‘blanket restriction’, and this was the key 
determinant  in its finding of a breach of the right to vote under Article 3 of Protocol 1.74   
   There is therefore a troubling lack of clarity about the crux question of what constitutes a 
‘blanket ban’ what constitutes a ‘general measure’. If a ban is categorised as ‘blanket’ this 
will benefit the applicant―it will be an uphill struggle for the defendant state to justify it; but 
if it is a ‘general measure’ then all the state has to demonstrate is that its legislators have 
carried out a thorough ventilation of the issues before coming down on the side of restriction.  
                                                          
72 ibid Judge Tulkens et al at [12-13]; Judge Ziemele et al at [2]. The was some discussion in ADI over whether 
the internet has replaced television as the most influential medium. The majority stressed the ‘immediate and 
powerful effect of the broadcast media’, the fact that they were ‘familiar sources of entertainment in the 
intimacy of the home’ and their ‘synchronicity’ as compared to the internet. ADI had argued that to single out 
broadcasting was  ‘illogical’ since the internet was equally if not more influential, but the majority held that 
there had been ‘no significant evidence of a sufficiently serious shift in the respective influences of the new and 
the broadcast media ... to undermine the need for the special measures for the latter’ at [117]. 
73 Hirst n 65 at [51]. 
74 ibid at [82]. 
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The initial categorisation will in effect determine the outcome of the case.  Will the 
adjudicative battleground, post ADI, become a struggle over categories? 
   Finally, as five of the dissenting judges explained, the ‘general measures’ doctrine is of 
distinctly dubious doctrinal provenance.75  The Court has dealt on multiple occasions with 
cases involving general prohibitions and ‘bright line rules’.76  But the Grand Chamber’s 
statement in ADI that ‘[i]t emerges from that case-law that, in order to determine the 
proportionality of a general measure, the Court must primarily assess the legislative choices 
underlying it’77 is loosely based on the single, limited and ageing authority of James and 
others  a case concerning leasehold enfranchisement legislation involving Article 1 of 
Protocol 1.78  Certainly the ‘general measures’ principle has not been deployed in the Court’s 
Article 10 case law hitherto.  In particular, no mention was made of the doctrine by the Court 
                                                          
75 ADI n 1 above, dissent of Judge Ziemele et al at [4-8]. 
76 Principles concerning ‘general measures’ have mainly been discussed by the Court, though not using this 
term, in cases concerning intimate and sensitive issues of personal autonomy and dignity (eg Pretty v UK [2002] 
35 EHRR 1 at [74]; Evans v UK ((2006) 43 EHRR 21 at 86] and [89]), cases involving economic and  social 
policy (eg James and others v UK (1986) 8 EHRR 123 [at 36 and [68]; Hatton & Others v UK ((2003) 37 
EHRR 28 at [128]), cases involving  pensions and welfare (eg Carson v UK [2009] ECHR 1272, 2 Sept 2009; 
Runkee v UK [2007] ECHR 373 10 May 2007 at [39]) and cases involving electoral law (eg Zdanoka v Latvia 
(2007) 45 EHRR 17 at [112-114]; Hirst v UK (no 2) n 65 above). For a general review of this area see P. Sales 
and B. Hooper ‘Proportionality and the Form of Law’ (2003) 119 LQR 426. See Judge Ziemele et al, ibid. 
77 ADI at [108] (emphasis added). 
78 James and others v United Kingdom (1986) 8 EHRR 123 at [36], though this principle in not expressly stated 
in these terms in the Court’s judgment, its origins appearing to lie in the UK government’s argument before the 
Commission, see James and others v UK App no 8793/79, 28 Jan 1983 (HUDOC) at 47 and 57. See R. Ó 
Fathaigh ‘Ban on Political Advertising Does Not Violate Article 10: Animal Defenders International v UK’  
Strasbourg Observers blog at http://strasbourgobservers.com/2013/04/24/ban-on-political-advertising-does-not-
violate-article-10/ 24 April 2013 (last visited 24 June 2013) 
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in its recent jurisprudence concerning bans on broadcast advertising, be it concerning 
political expression or religious expression.  Furthermore, the Grand Chamber’s key assertion 
that ‘the more convincing the general justifications for the general measure are, the less 
importance the Court will attach to its impact in the particular case’ is stated to be based, with 
quite striking vagueness, on ‘elements of its analysis’ in VgT, Murphy and TV Vest, with a 
conspicuous absence of any specific paragraph references.79  The case that would most 
support the Grand Chamber’s argument is the religious advertising ban case of Murphy and 
no such ‘general measures’ methodology was used there.  Rather that case was expressly 
distinguished from the political expression case, VgT, by virtue of the type of expression 
involved (religious, not political) and the particular sensitivities associated with religion, 
especially in Ireland, leading the Court to afford a wider margin of appreciation to the Irish 
state.80   
 
Previous authorities  
Perhaps the other most striking feature of ADI is the Grand Chamber’s apparent rejection of 
its approach in VgT and TV Vest.81  The Strasbourg court does not operate a system of 
binding precedent, the Convention being a ‘living instrument which ... must be interpreted in 
the light of present day conditions’.82  Nevertheless the Court has previously held the position 
                                                          
79 ADI at [109]. See R. Ó Fathaigh ibid. 
80 Murphy v Ireland [67].  ADI n 1 above , dissent of Judge Ziemele et al at [8].See n 37 above. See further A. 
Geddis ‘You Can’t Say “God” on the Radio: Freedom of Expression, Religious Advertising and the Broadcast 
Media after Murphy v Ireland’ (2004) EHRLR 181.  
81 ADI n 1 above dissents of Judge Ziemele et al at [1] and of Judge Tulkens et al at [12]. 
82 Tyrer v UK (1978) 2 EHRR 1 at [31]. 
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that ‘it is in the interests of legal certainty, foreseeability and equality before the law that it 
should not depart, without good reason, from precedents laid down in previous cases’.83   
   The Grand Chamber in ADI declined to follow its earlier approach notwithstanding the 
‘essentially identical’ facts of the VgT case,84 and the later reaffirmation of the VgT approach 
in TV Vest.85  But it is not at all clear, from the majority judgment, what status these earlier 
authorities retain.  They were not expressly overruled, and there are hints that the earlier 
cases might be distinguished: the group in VgT  was responding to a particular advertising 
campaign, as compared to ADI which had been seeking to initiate a debate whilst TV Vest 
concerned a political party (as opposed to an NGO) and a different kind of regulatory 
regime.86  But these points were never clearly spelled out by the Grand Chamber and as a 
result we are left in a state of uncertainty.  
   As the dissenting judges in ADI pointed out, there appears to be a ‘double standard’ 
operating within the Convention ‘whose minimum standards should be equally applicable to 
all the States parties to it’. 87  Why were the ‘essentially identical “general prohibitions”’ 
considered to be ‘not necessary in Swiss democratic society, but  ... necessary in the ... United 
Kingdom’. 88At the very least states like Switzerland, Norway and Denmark, all of which 
reformed their systems in order to comply with the VgT ruling, might feel aggrieved at the 
Grand Chamber’s apparent U turn.  
                                                          
83 Christine Goodwin v UK (2002) 35 EHRR 18 at [74]; Stafford v UK (2002) 35 EHRR 32 at [68]. 
84 ADI n 1 above dissent of Judge Ziemele et al at [1]. Lord Bingham described the facts of the cases as being 
very similar,  Animal Defenders n 25 at  [9]. 
85 See n 41 above. 
86 ADI  n 1 above, UK Government’s arguments at [98]. 
87 ADI  n 1above dissent of Judge Ziemele et al at [1]. 
88 ibid. 
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   The irony here is inescapable.  One of the main reasons why the Grand Chamber found for 
the United Kingdom was because the Communications Act ban avoided the uncertainty of 
more finely tailored regimes.89  But its failure to deal clearly and explicitly with the earlier 
case law means that uncertainty still abounds.  For example: would a group in the United 
Kingdom responding to a commercial advertising campaign on an issue of public controversy  
(as opposed to initiating a debate) be found to have its Article 10 rights breached by the 
ban?90  If Switzerland, Norway or Denmark decided to reintroduce their own bans, and their 
legislative organs conducted searching debates on the issue, would they now, in the wake of 
ADI, be entitled to do so?  We don’t know. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
The eight dissentient judges in ADI summed up the Communications Act prohibition thus:  
 
‘this is a ban which concerns the most protected form of expression (discussion on matters of 
public interest) by one of the most important categories of actors in the democratic process 
(an NGO) and a form of media which remains influential (radio and/or television), without 
the least exception’.91   
 
                                                          
89 ADI n 1 above at  [122] 
90 This possibility was suggested, obiter, in the House of Lords hearing of ADI by Lord Bingham at [34]  and 
Lord Scott at [41].  The latter gave examples: adverts for burgers might offend those groups who disagree with 
the way beef cattle are reared and slaughtered; adverts for Christmas turkeys might offend those who oppose 
factory farming of poultry.  
91 ADI  n 1 above dissent of Judge Tulkens et al at [13]. Almost identical words were used by Judge Ziemele et 
al at [2].   
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To illustrate by way of example, under the current state of affairs a car manufacturer may 
advertise its SUVs on television without limit (finances permitting), but an NGO wishing to 
publicise the impact of such vehicles on the environment is prohibited by law from doing 
so.92  Perhaps unsurprisingly, therefore, the judgment was greeted with dismay by those who 
feel that social advocacy groups are hard done by under the current regime.93 
    Nevertheless, many were relieved by the decision, closing the door, as it does, firstly on 
any slide towards ‘US-style political advertising’ and, secondly, on the provision of a 
commercial broadcasting platform for those with far more controversial views than ADI.94 
Setting to one side the free speech arguments, however, one cannot help feeling that the 
majority of the Grand Chamber were desperate to reach the conclusion they did, casting to 
                                                          
92 Judge Tulkens et al commented that whilst ADI is prohibited from airing its views via broadcast 
advertisements, ‘a commercial firm ... would have full freedom, limited only by its financial resources, to screen 
advertisements using animals to promote its products, an approach directly contrary to the views of [ADI]’ at 
[19]. 
93 R. English, ‘Strasbourg ties itself in knots over advertising ban’ UK Human Rights Blog 22 April 2013 at 
http://ukhumanrightsblog.com/2013/04/23/strasbourg-ties-itself-in-knots-over-advertising-ban (last visited 24 
June 2013) O. Bowcott ‘Animal rights group fails to overturn ban on political advertising’ The Guardian 22 April 
2013; J. Creamer ‘Comment: Political Advertising should be allowed on UK television’ politics.co.uk 24 April 
2013,  at http://www.politics.co.uk/comment-analysis/2013/04/24/comment-political-advertising-should-be-
allowed-on-uk-tv (last visitied 24 June 2013). 
94 J. Rozenberg, ‘Government will be mightily relieved at decision to uphold political ads ban’ The Guardian 22 
April 2013; J. Rowbottom, ‘A surprise ruling? Strasbourg upholds the ban on paid political ads on TV and 
Radio’  UK Constitutional  Law Blog 22nd April 2013  at  http://ukconstitutionallaw.org/2013/04/22/jacob-
rowbottom-a-surprise-ruling-strasbourg-upholds-the-ban-on-paid-political-ads-on-tv-and-radio/. Judge Bratza in 
his concurring opinion in ADI at [7] provided examples of more ‘controversial’ areas: ‘abortion, immigration, 
gay marriage and climate change’. 
 24 
 
the wind established case law and essentially creating from scratch a whole new ‘general 
measures’ doctrine. 
   Much has been written recently of the possibility of dialogue between national institutions 
and the Strasbourg court.95  Perhaps ADI is a perfect example of just such a dialogue.  A more 
cynical conclusion would be that, against the backdrop of the famously hostile reaction 
amongst the British political classes and media to the Court’s judgment in Hirst, the Grand 
Chamber had reason to think twice before interfering again with the mechanisms of British 
democracy. 96  Perhaps ADI is an example of sensible dialogue.  Perhaps, less charitably, is it 
a case of |Strasbourg losing its nerve. 
 
                                                          
95 M. Amos ‘The Dialogue Between United Kingdom Courts and the European Court of Human Rights’ (2012) 
ICLQ 557; J.P. Costa ‘The relationship between the European Court of Human Rights and the national courts’ 
(2013) EHRLR 264. 
96 David Cameron famously declared that it would make him ‘ physically ill even to contemplate having to give 
the vote to anyone who is in prison’ HC Deb vol 517 col 921 3 Nov 2010;   P. Wintour and A. Sparrow ‘I won’t 
give prisoners the vote, says David Cameron’  The Guardian 24 October 2012.  After a debate on 10 February 
2011 the House of Commons voted by 234 to 22 in favour of retaining the blanket ban on prisoner voting, HC 
Deb vol 523 col 493 - 585  10 February 2011.   The draft Voting Eligibility (Voting) Bill proposes three options 
one of which is to retain the status quo  in defiance of the ruling in Hirst at 
http://www.parliament.uk/business/committees/committees-a-z/joint-select/draft-voting-eligibility-prisoners-
bill/ (last visited 24 June 2013); J. Chapman and J. Groves ‘MPs begin historic debate over whether to take a 
stand against Europe and overturn urulint that prisoners must have the vote’ Mail Online 18 February 2011 at 
http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-1355376/Prisoners-vote-MPs-stand-UK-rights-overturn-EU-
ruling.html (last visited 24 June 2013) ; Craig Woodhouse ‘Prison paedos “will get vote”: Euro judges demand 
ballot for lags’ The Sun  23 December 2012 at 
http://www.thesun.co.uk/sol/homepage/news/politics/4711067/Prison-paedos-will-get-vote.html   (last visited 
24 June 2013). 
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